Arrest by Ministerial Command is Not the Rule of Law

Uganda's fight against corruption must be firm and visible, but recent ministerial arrest directives raise serious questions about due process, institutional independence and the constitutional limits of political authority.

Ugandans are understandably angry about corruption. Every unfinished road, poorly equipped health centre, ghost project or public job allegedly sold to the highest bidder represents money taken from citizens who already carry a heavy economic burden.

Government is therefore right to investigate corruption in local authorities and hold public officials accountable where evidence of wrongdoing exists.

But the recent wave of arrests associated with directives from the Minister of State for Local Government, Balaam Barugahara, raises an equally important question: can the fight against corruption remain credible if the methods used to pursue it disregard due process?

During recent inspection visits, the minister has reportedly ordered the immediate arrest of several local government officials. In Bulambuli, a former District Health Officer was arrested following questions about a reported Shs73 million toilet project. In Mbarara City, senior officials were taken into custody over allegations involving corruption, revenue leakages and irregular expenditure. In Mitooma, the minister directed security agencies to arrest the chairman of the District Service Commission and the acting District Medical Officer over allegations that they solicited Shs19 million from a job applicant.

These are serious allegations and deserve prompt investigation. But allegations, however disturbing, are not convictions. The people accused remain innocent until proved guilty by a competent court.

The Constitution distributes public power among different institutions for good reason. The Uganda Police Force investigates crime and apprehends suspects. The Director of Public Prosecutions determines whether available evidence supports prosecution, while courts determine guilt or innocence.

A minister exercises political and administrative supervision. He or she may inspect local governments, receive complaints, demand records, order administrative audits and refer suspected criminal conduct to the police, the Inspectorate of Government, the State House Anti-Corruption Unit or another competent institution.

What a minister should not do is assume, in the same proceeding, the roles of complainant, investigator, prosecutor and judge.

Article 212 of the Constitution assigns the police responsibility for preventing and detecting crime and apprehending offenders. Section 23 of the Police Act permits a police officer to arrest without a warrant in specified circumstances, including where the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed an arrestable offence.

The important words are “reasonable grounds”. The arresting officer must independently satisfy himself or herself that the legal threshold has been met. A minister's anger, suspicion or public command cannot substitute for that legal judgment.

There is a material difference between saying, “These allegations should be investigated urgently,” and commanding, “Arrest that person immediately.” The first respects institutional roles. The second risks turning political authority into a parallel criminal justice system.

Some recent interventions appear to follow a troubling pattern: a minister arrives at a local government, listens to complaints, inspects a project, questions an official and then announces an arrest, sometimes before cameras and an assembled crowd.

It may make compelling television and demonstrate political resolve, but criminal responsibility cannot safely be determined through an impromptu public hearing.

A visibly defective project may suggest wrongdoing, but it does not by itself establish who is criminally responsible. Poor workmanship could arise from fraud, negligence, breach of contract, inadequate supervision or even a dispute over what was actually procured.

An official may also have an explanation that can only be tested by examining contracts, payment vouchers, procurement files, technical reports and the responsibilities of other officers. That is why criminal investigations require trained investigators, witness statements, documentary evidence and an objective assessment of competing explanations.

When a minister rejects an explanation on the spot and orders an arrest, personal impression risks replacing evidence and political theatre replacing institutional investigation.

Of greater concern are reports that some arrested officials are simply taken to police stations without a clearly disclosed offence or charge, with officers allegedly receiving instructions that suspects should not be released even when investigations remain incomplete and the constitutional 48-hour period has expired.

If that is happening, it is unconstitutional.

Article 23 requires a person who is arrested to be informed immediately, in a language he or she understands, of the reasons for the arrest. The arrested person must also be allowed access to a lawyer and, where appropriate, family members.

Most importantly, a person arrested on suspicion of committing a criminal offence must be brought before a court as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than 48 hours from the time of arrest.

The Constitution does not say “48 working hours”. It does not exclude weekends or public holidays, nor does it make the deadline dependent on the convenience of investigators. The clock begins when a person is deprived of liberty.

Where investigations cannot be completed within that period, police may consider release on police bond in accordance with the law. Police bond is not an acquittal and does not terminate an investigation; it allows a suspect to remain at liberty while continuing to report to investigators as required.

A minister has no lawful power to direct that a suspect must not receive police bond, just as political instructions cannot extend the constitutional detention period. After 48 hours, the State must either produce the suspect before a competent court or release him or her.

Police stations must never become warehouses into which political officials deposit citizens while investigators search for an offence.

Uganda has already received judicial guidance on this question.

While serving as Minister of State for Lands, the current Attorney General, Dr Sam Mayanja, adopted a similarly interventionist approach to land disputes. He frequently held public meetings, made findings about contested ownership and directed the arrest of people accused of land grabbing, trespass and unlawful eviction.

In Kanaba Estates and Agencies Ltd v Dr Sam Mayanja and Another, Miscellaneous Cause No. 0001 of 2025, the minister was accused of directing the arrest of a company director, specifying the offences with which suspects should be charged and ordering that they should not be granted police bond.

Justice Jamson Karemani held that the minister had no power to direct the charges to be preferred or order that suspects be denied police bond. Such directives interfered with the constitutional mandates of the Uganda Police Force and the DPP. The court declared the directives illegal, irrational and procedurally improper and quashed them.

The principle is straightforward: a minister may refer a matter to police for investigation. If an investigation establishes an offence, the competent law-enforcement and prosecutorial authorities determine the next step.

What was unlawful when applied to land disputes does not become lawful simply because the same approach is now being used in an anti-corruption campaign.

As Attorney General and the Government's principal legal adviser, Dr Mayanja is uniquely placed to ensure that the Executive learns from that judgment and draws a clear line between legitimate ministerial oversight and criminal investigation and prosecution.

The phrase “arrest to aid investigations” has become dangerously routine. In a constitutional democracy, investigation should ordinarily establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify arrest. Arrest should not become the opening step from which investigators begin searching for evidence.

There will certainly be circumstances where immediate arrest is necessary, including where an offence is being committed in the presence of an officer, evidence is likely to be destroyed, witnesses are being threatened or a suspect is likely to abscond. But those circumstances must be assessed by a legally authorised investigating officer and properly recorded.

Arrest should never become a means of punishing a public officer before trial, satisfying an angry crowd or demonstrating that a visiting minister is “working”.

A premature arrest can actually undermine an anti-corruption investigation. It may alert other suspects, compromise evidence, create procedural irregularities and expose the State to civil liability. It may also allow a genuinely culpable person to portray himself or herself as a victim of political persecution.

The minister's determination to confront corruption should not be dismissed. Citizens deserve visible accountability, and ministers should not ignore credible complaints simply because investigations take time.

The answer is not ministerial silence; it is lawful institutional action.

Where an inspection reveals suspected wrongdoing, the minister should secure relevant public records through lawful administrative channels and formally refer the matter to the appropriate investigative body, whether the Inspectorate of Government, police or another competent institution. The public can then be given periodic updates without compromising investigations or the presumption of innocence.

Where an official's continued presence in office could compromise evidence or interfere with witnesses, lawful procedures for interdiction or suspension should be followed. Administrative interdiction, however, must not be confused with criminal guilt and should respect the affected officer's right to notice, reasons and a fair opportunity to respond.

Police must independently determine whether reasonable grounds for arrest exist. The DPP must independently assess whether the evidence supports prosecution. Police bond and court bail must be considered according to law rather than political preference.

Every arrested person must be told why they have been arrested, allowed access to counsel and either produced before court within 48 hours or released.

Uganda does not have to choose between fighting corruption and protecting human rights. The two objectives reinforce each other. A credible anti-corruption campaign is one that produces lawfully obtained evidence, fair trials and sustainable convictions, not public humiliation, unexplained detention and abandoned case files.

Ministers should supervise. Investigators should investigate. Police should arrest only on lawful grounds. The DPP should prosecute independently, and courts should determine guilt.

No corrupt official should escape accountability. But no citizen should lose his or her liberty simply because a minister has pointed a finger.

That balance—firm enforcement restrained by constitutional rights, institutional independence and due process—is not an obstacle to fighting corruption. It is what makes the fight legitimate.