What are the takeaways from the Bwowe appeal?

This past week, a number of candidates taking part in the Nakawa Division West parliamentary race heaved a sigh of relief after the High Court in Kampala dismissed an appeal by Mr Ivan Bwowe of the People’s Front for Freedom (PFF). Widely seen as a dispute over nomenclature, that is Nakawa West versus Nakawa Division West, the case left an indelible mark on the jurisprudential landscape. “At its core was a stark question: Should technical or clerical imperfections in nomination documents, absent demonstrable prejudice, be sufficient to extinguish political competition and hand victory to a candidate unopposed?”

Mr Isaac Christopher Lubogo wrote in a sui generis legal note. The High Court in Kampala dismissed the appeal, clearing the way for Mr Joel Ssenyonyi, the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament (LoP), to attempt to secure a second term in the House. In a judgment delivered by Justice Collins Acellam on Thursday, the court upheld a decision of the Electoral Commission (EC) that clerical errors on nomination papers, where candidates wrote “Nakawa West” instead of the gazetted “Nakawa Division West”, did not invalidate the nominations.

What are the implications of the Court’s decision?

The EC answered in the negative—and in doing so, reaffirmed a substance-centred approach to electoral adjudication. Under Ugandan law, nomination is not a routine administrative exercise. It is the constitutional gateway through which the right to be elected under Article 59 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995), is realised. Any challenge to nomination, therefore, implicates not only statutory compliance but also the health of constitutional democracy itself. Mr Bwowe’s petition argued that the use of the term “Nakawa West”—a constituency not expressly gazetted—rendered rival “nominations void ab initio.” The relief sought was extreme, wrote Dr Lubogo, noting that nullification of all rival nominations and a declaration that he was duly elected unopposed.

Experts say this approach placed the dispute at the crossroads of two competing theories in electoral law: strict compliance, which treats technical errors as fatal, and substantive or purposive compliance, which asks whether the law’s democratic purpose has been defeated. The EC rejected what Dr Lubogo described as “hyper-formalism”, finding that: Nakawa Division West is the legally recognised constituency; all candidates, including Bwowe himself, completed official EC control forms bearing the correct constituency; any reference to “Nakawa West” was contextual, clerical, and incapable of misleading voters or conferring unfair advantage. Crucially, the Commission found no evidence of prejudice—no voter confusion, no distortion of competition, and no uncertainty as to the constituency in issue. This absence of prejudice proved decisive.

How exactly did the absence of prejudice prove decisive?

Mr Julius Katamba, a political analyst, said the court relied on the principle of substance over form, finding that the naming variation between “Nakawa West” and “Nakawa Division West” did not create material confusion or prejudice the electoral process. “The judge was satisfied that the EC and the candidates clearly understood the constituency in question, and that voters were not misled. While the ruling does not radically change electoral law, it reinforces earlier decisions that minor administrative or clerical inconsistencies, without demonstrable harm, are insufficient grounds to nullify a nomination,” Mr Katamba said.

According to him the decision signals judicial restraint in interfering with electoral processes on technical grounds and places a heavier burden on petitioners to prove actual confusion or injustice, not just procedural imperfections. “It also serves as a caution to the Electoral Commission to standardize constituency naming to avoid avoidable disputes. Going forward, courts are likely to discourage litigation based purely on semantics while urging electoral bodies to improve clarity and consistency in official documents and ballots,” he said. He added that the reasoning is consistent with Ugandan constitutional jurisprudence, which requires electoral laws to be interpreted purposively so as to expand participation rather than constrict it (Tinyefuza Vs Attorney General [1997] UGCC).

It also aligns with comparative jurisprudence holding that procedural irregularities, which do not affect substance or outcome should not invalidate electoral processes (Morgan Vs Simpson [1975]; Raila Odinga Vs IEBC [2017]). Doctrinally, Mr Katamba further contends, the decision reinforces a principle long articulated but inconsistently applied in Uganda: electoral law is not a game of ambushes and traps. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Kizza Besigye v Museveni [2006], elections should not be annulled on the basis of trivial or clerical defects.

Aside from its take on nomenclature, is it correct to say the verdict draws a line in the sand when it comes to opportunistic litigation?

Dr Lubogo believes so. He rightly points out that Bwowe’s attempt to secure an unopposed declaration reflects a growing tendency to pursue procedural knockouts instead of electoral persuasion. The dismissal, he further notes, makes clear that democratic legitimacy will be earned at the ballot; not manufactured through technical exclusion. The case reflects a gradual shift from rigid formalism toward democratic functionalism—an approach that asks whether an alleged defect: undermines voter choice, distorts electoral competition, or violates a clear constitutional or statutory command.

Where none of these thresholds is met, restraint is preferred. Importantly, the decision clarifies the standard for invalidating nominations in Uganda: a defect must be material, substantive, and prejudicial. Mere error, without consequence, is insufficient. This promotes legal certainty, discourages frivolous challenges, and protects the electoral calendar from paralysis. “The ruling affirms the EC’s administrative discretion to manage electoral processes pragmatically, subject to legality and reasonableness.

Courts reviewing such decisions are likely to apply judicial deference, especially where the Commission acts to preserve participation rather than suppress it (Council of Civil Service Unions Vs Minister for the Civil Service [1985]),” Dr Lubogo writes the a sui generis legal note. Beyond doctrine, the decision carries important normative weight, argues Dr Lubogo, noting that by keeping Ssenyonyi and other candidates on the ballot, the Commission preserved voter autonomy, strengthened democratic legitimacy, and reinforced public confidence in electoral institutions. In emerging and contested democracies, procedural overreach can be as damaging as outright fraud. The Commission’s restraint, therefore, served not only legal coherence but democratic stability.

Does the decision automatically establish a binding precedent for future cases?

Mr Timothy Chemonges, a lawyer, does not think so principally because each electoral dispute must be determined on its own facts. “The ruling may be cited persuasively in future disputes where courts are asked to balance strict legal compliance against practical considerations. The concern, he notes, is that if this approach is applied too broadly, it risks blurring the line between a correctable technical error and a clear breach of the law,” Mr Chemonges says.

Mr Chemonges further observes that the decision raises serious questions about certainty, legality, and consistency in the electoral process. “Elections depend on clarity—clear constituencies, clear nomination procedures, and clear legal standards. Treating constituency names as interchangeable, despite not being gazetted as such, creates room for confusion and uneven application of the law. The ruling places a heavy responsibility on the Electoral Commission to ensure nomination processes are accurate and legally sound from the outset,” he says.

How has Mr Bwowe taken the decision?

Mr Bwowe told this reporter on Friday that the decision by the court was poor.

“The court avoided, without any reason approximately, 99 percent of the submissions advanced by the appellant/appeal was grounded. In doing so, the court, in my view, failed to engage meaningfully with the core issues, legal contentions raised and facts conceded by the respondents, depriving us of a bare minimum of good jurisprudence,” Mr Bwowe said.

How about LoP Ssenyonyi?

But, Mr Ssenyonyi posted on X (formerly Twitter), quoting Jeremiah 1:19—they will fight against you, but they shall not prevail against you, for I am with you, declares the Lord, to deliver you. He then wrote: “The effort of the appellant, through this petition, is an audacious attempt to SNEAK to Parliament to represent a group of people whose mandate he has not obtained. I agree with counsel for the respondents that the ‘Nakawa West Constituency’ and ‘Nakawa Division West Constituency’ are one and the same but often used interchangeably.”