Uganda’s ICC Engagement Carries Rising Strategic Risks

Uganda is deepening its involvement in the International Criminal Court through judicial nominations and representation, but shifting global power dynamics, US opposition, and strained alliances raise questions about whether the country’s participation serves its long-term political and economic interests.

Uganda continues to strengthen its position within the International Criminal Court (ICC). Since 2018, the experienced international judge Solomy Balungi Bossa has represented Uganda at the ICC.

In December last year, Uganda officially nominated Judge Rosette Musoke-Morrison, who possesses extensive international experience, including at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, for a position as an ICC judge.

These developments indicate Uganda's intention to enhance its presence at the ICC and view it as a pragmatic step. However, the government’s pragmatism is based on the logic of an old world order. Amid changes in the global landscape, participation in the ICC is becoming a far more politically and economically risky step for Uganda than it promises in benefits.

Uganda's strategic partner, the United States, has opposed the ICC for many years. The US refused to ratify the Rome Statute due to fears that the Court could prosecute American politicians and military personnel, thereby limiting its foreign policy actions. In 2002, the United States enacted the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, commonly known as the "Hague Invasion Act."

This law prohibits cooperation with the Court and mandates restrictions on military and economic aid to countries cooperating with the ICC.

In the 2000s, there was precedent when the US suspended military aid to more than 35 countries, including Colombia, Brazil, Mali, and Benin, until they signed bilateral agreements not to surrender US citizens to the Court.

During his second term, President Donald Trump took more radical steps in foreign policy. One of his early decisions was a shift from comprehensive humanitarian aid to a "Trade over Aid" policy.

Uganda was among the countries that experienced pressure under this approach: shipments of medicines and test kits declined, mortality rates rose, and food supplies were reduced. Under these circumstances, Uganda is compelled to align with the "Trade over Aid" approach and prepare to build more transactional commercial relations with the United States.

This reassessment of relationships is unfolding against the backdrop of renewed confrontation between the US administration and the ICC. Following investigations into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the situation in Gaza and cases related to Afghanistan, the US imposed sanctions on 11 ICC judges.

Among them was Ugandan judge Solomy Balungi Bossa, who was involved in decisions concerning the Afghanistan investigation. Furthermore, the introduction of the "Prohibition of Grants to States that Arrest Certain Foreign Officials in Cooperation with the ICC" bill in the US Congress passed with limited attention. Trump is known for his preference for swift and assertive policy decisions, and these moves create leverage over countries cooperating with the Court.

The election of Ugandan judge Rosette Musoke-Morrison to the ICC would obligate her to participate in cases involving Netanyahu and the situation in Afghanistan, potentially provoking a retaliatory US response, including sanctions and possible reductions in military and economic assistance. This would be particularly sensitive for Uganda, given the already reduced levels of financial support.

Another significant risk for Uganda is the potential strain on relations with Israel, a longstanding partner in security and technology. Despite US opposition, the ICC has not halted its investigation into Netanyahu. This means that current and future Ugandan judges may be required to participate in proceedings involving a key partner state and implement ICC directives.

Such involvement could create diplomatic tension and affect the scale and depth of military and economic cooperation between Uganda and Israel.

At the same time, participation in the ICC offers limited tangible benefits to Uganda. Although the Court convicted Dominic Ongwen for numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity and ordered reparations, he is unable to pay, and victims have yet to receive compensation.

An arrest warrant for Joseph Kony was issued in 2005, yet he remains at large. Moreover, more than 30 of the Court's 34 cases have involved African situations, exposing political and military figures from the continent to potential external pressure through prosecution mechanisms.

In effect, participation in the International Criminal Court presents significant risks for Uganda’s relations with key partners, offers limited protection for victims of war crimes, and introduces strategic vulnerabilities in both foreign and domestic policy. The balance suggests that the costs may outweigh the benefits.